Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for information Operations Network-centric warfare (NCW) emphasizes information superiority for battlespace efficacy, but it is clear that the mechanics of how knowledge flows are just as important as those pertaining to the networks and communication systems used to transmit data and information. Unfortunately, with the strong presumption that knowledge is distinct from data and information, knowledge-flow mechanics in the warfare context are not well understood; even the term knowledge is used in conflicting ways (e.g., to describe information flows) by NCW experts, operational personnel and developers of military doctrine. Mapping key concepts from technologically enabled business models-on which NCW is based in large part-to the military, we substitute the term understanding flow when discussing the mechanics of how knowledge flows in the NCW context. In one respect, this mapping and terminological substitution enable us to move forward and model knowledge-flow mechanics in a manner that is consistent with the operational Navy's lexicon; in another respect, however, it is clear that Navy lexicon does not yet include the term understanding flow. Hence, naval conceptualization of NCW may be missing a vital element.
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NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE AND UNDERSTANDING FLOW
Network-centric warfare (NCW) represents a revolutionary concept and dramatic departure from the longpracticed platform-centric warfare doctrine and methods it is expected to replace. Although many proponents characterize NCW as the "most important RMA [revolution in military affairs] in the past 200 years" (Cebrowski and Gartska 1998, p. 29) , our understanding of this novel and compelling approach to military warfare remains primitive. For instance, NCW emphasizes speed for tactical advantage, but such speed pertains as much to decision-making, command and control as it does to maneuver; NCW further emphasizes information superiority for battlespace efficacy, but it is clear that much more is included than just the networks and communications infrastructure-impressive as it has become for a sea-based environment-associated with flows of information (and data).
By mistake, some have focused on communication networks, not on warfare or operations where the focus should rightly be. Networks are merely a means to an end; they convey "stuff" from one place to another and they are the purview of technologists" (Alberts et al. 1999, p. 92) .
Indeed, without computer automation and decision aids, simply increasing the speed of (data and) information flows can quickly overwhelm even the most capable commanders. Further, the U.S. Navy understands that knowledge is key, for the warfighter must know what to do with information. Consider a seasoned (e.g., with 20 years' experience) Navy Captain (i.e., O-6) and a newly commissioned Ensign (i.e., O-1) in the information center of a ship underway and in combat. One can provide exactly the same data and information (e.g., through displays, reports, observations, staff members) to both naval officers, but the more experienced person would be expected to exhibit superior performance (e.g., in terms of decisionmaking speed, thoroughness of observations, efficacy of actions). Since the data and information presented to both officers is identical, the differential performance must be attributable to the difference in knowledge possessed by the two people. Such experience-based knowledge differential helps to explain why Navy Captains are authorized to command naval vessels whereas Ensigns are not, regardless of how technically sophisticated the ships' information systems may be.
The realization that knowledge is key to NCW is made explicit through the concept battlespace knowledge. We even find a whole published volume devoted to the construct dominant battlespace knowledge (Johnson and Libicki 1995) . Consider, for instance, the following excerpt from a recent book on NCW (Alberts et al. 1999, p. 126) .
The key to understanding the roles and the relationships among battlespace entities is to focus on processes that turn raw data into information and information into knowledge. … battlespace knowledge consists of tacit information … requires interpretation … can seldom be transferred quickly and easily. … Examples include capabilities and tactics of an adversary, local customs and intent. … Battlespace knowledge is a people-centric capability.
Interestingly, NCW is based in large part on, and in many respects parallels, advances in business models enabled by information technology (Cebrowski and Gartska 1998) . From current research in the business domain, we understand that knowledge is not evenly distributed through any enterpriseparticularly not those very large, geographically distributed ones such as global manufacturing firms, telecommunications companies and naval forces-and rapid, efficient knowledge flows are critical to efficacy in business and warfare alike. The research described in this technical report addresses the enhancement of enterprise knowledge flows directly, and it develops and applies a novel model for identifying and classifying various knowledge-flow patterns that can be observed in the modern enterprise.
The analysis of such knowledge-flow patterns is useful to inform the design of information systems and business processes that increase enterprise performance, and we focus explicitly on performance of the military enterprise through NCW.
This focus on the flow of knowledge reflects an inherently dynamic view, one that draws its rationale from the physical sciences, in which a multitude of useful devices (e.g., computers, aircraft) are designed and developed through principles and methods of engineering. In sharp contrast, many information systems and business processes employed in business and military enterprises are designed and developed through trial and error, clearly one of the least efficient approaches known. Imaging trying to develop useful electronic devices (e.g., amplifiers, integrated circuits) without possessing a thorough understanding of how electricity flows, or expecting to develop useful aviation devices (e.g., engines, wings) without thorough knowledge of how air flows. Analogously, what would lead one to believe that useful business and military devices (e.g., knowledge amplifiers, knowledge engines) can be developed without a thorough understanding of how knowledge flows?
Mapping Military and Business Concepts
Before we can effectively address how to enhance knowledge flow to increase the efficacy of NCW, it is important to overcome differences between military and business conceptualizations of knowledge flow.
Specifically, fundamental terms such as data, information and knowledge have conflicting differences in terms of meaning, definition and use between these environments; we also find that NCW experts, operational personnel and developers of military doctrine in the Navy inadvertently confuse important concepts and incorrectly interchange key terms in a manner that impairs effective communication and obstructs the principled design of useful information systems and business processes.
The Military uses a model called the Cognitive Hierarchy (NDP6 1995), which outlines a four-tier hierarchy interrelating raw data, processed data, knowledge and understanding. At the "bottom" of this hierarchy, we find raw data, which are abundant (e.g., through sensor input) and easily transmitted via automated systems but not particularly useful on their own. Lying just "above" this hierarchical level, we find processed data (e.g., through sensor fusion, displays), which are more useful but less abundant and more difficult to transmit automatically. Further "up" in this hierarchy, we find knowledge, which in this context pertains to what is happening (e.g., situational awareness) in a military environment; because most of the highly valued knowledge in an enterprise is tacit, its "transmission" takes place in the minds of people and via interpersonal communication, which makes such knowledge relatively difficult to convey and share (e.g., a Common Operational Picture). The "top" position of the hierarchy is occupied by understanding, which pertains to why things are happening as they are (e.g., forces amassing for coordinated attack); here, as understanding represents an even more tacit capability of people, it is very difficult to share and slow to flow through an enterprise.
Insightful as this cognitive hierarchy model may be, however, the same kind of hierarchical model is also employed in the business environment, but with many of the same terms having different meanings.
Compare the knowledge-information-data (KID) model, illustrated in Figure 1 , that is common in the business domain (Nissen 2002) . Here, we find a similar hierarchical relationship with data on the "bottom," but this latter model has only three levels, with information in the "middle" and knowledge on "top." In this business model, data refers to raw facts that are high in abundance but low in terms of actionability (i.e., one's ability to take useful actions, such as correct decisions or appropriate behaviors).
Information builds upon data to provide context and become more actionable, but useful information is scarcer than data. Knowledge builds upon information to enable action directly, but in comparison with either data or information, knowledge is quite scarce in the enterprise. Notice in this latter business model that we can only speculate as to what useful concept, if any, may lie "above" knowledge (e.g., wisdom, enlightenment). Therefore, to adapt our emerging models and tools pertaining to knowledge flow in the business environment and apply them to NCW in the military context, we need to observe the conceptual mapping delineated in the figure. Thus, throughout this report, where current research on enhancing knowledge-flow dynamics is applied to NCW, we substitute the term understanding flow to depict the military context of this work; that is, this technical report explicitly addresses understanding understanding flow for NCW.
The balance of the technical report is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide conceptual background for understanding understanding flow, which is followed by development of a model to describe and explain understanding-flow dynamics. To help make understanding-flow concepts and applications concrete, we employ our model to Navy-led, joint task force (JTF) operations at sea. The report closes with key conclusions and topics for continued research along these lines.
UNDERSTANDING UNDERSTANDING FLOW
This section summarizes key background work pertaining to understanding flow. The section begins by drawing from the emerging knowledge management literature. Research to integrate re-engineering with knowledge management is then covered, after which we outline the theoretical underpinnings used to advance the modeling of understanding flow through this study.
Knowledge Management Literature
The emerging phenomenon of knowledge management (KM) is generating substantial attention. Miles et al. (1998, p. 281) caution, however, "knowledge, despite its increasing abundance, may elude managerial approaches created in 20 th century mindsets and methods." In fact, knowledge is proving difficult to manage, and knowledge work has been stubbornly resistant to re-engineering and process innovation (Davenport 1995) . For one thing, Nonaka (1994) describes knowledge-creation as primarily an individual activity, performed by knowledge workers that are mostly professional, well educated and relatively autonomous, often with substantial responsibility in the organization. They tend to seek and value their relative autonomy and often resist perceived interference by management in knowledge-work activities (Davenport et al. 1996) .
Moreover, substantial important knowledge is tacit (Polanyi 1967) , unstructured (Nonaka 1994) and external to the organization (Frappaolo 1998) . This can greatly impede the identification, acquisition, interpretation and application of such knowledge. Also, corporate knowledge has historically been stored on paper and in the minds of people (O'Leary 1998) . Paper is notoriously difficult to access in quantity and keep current on a distributed basis, and knowledge kept in the minds of workers is vulnerable to loss through employee turnover and attrition.
The KM literature has been surging lately, particularly with recent contributions through several scholarly publications. For instance, we now have a variety of perspectives on knowledge transfer, including the understanding of context (Augier et al. 2001) , mentoring and storytelling (Swap et al. 2001) , and situations promoting knowledge reuse (Markus 2001) . As another instance, researchers are helping us to understand the importance of narrative (Linde 2001) , types of knowledge-based innovation (Cardinal et al. 2001) , organizational knowledge contingency factors (Becerra-Fernandez and Sabherwal 2001) , and situated learning (Nidumolu et al. 2001) . Further, researchers are fostering KM research agendas as well as taxonomies to help organize KM strategies (Earl 2001) , and organizational factors such as capabilities (Gold et al. 2001 ) and perceptions of ownership in terms of information and expertise (Jarvenpaa and Staples 2001) are now taking shape in terms of understanding.
For the purposes of this report, three important concepts from the KM literature are briefly summarized below: 1) extant information technology, 2) knowledge-based systems, and 3) knowledge management life cycle. The corresponding discussion helps frame current thinking and activity in KM and is specifically focused on concepts employed in the present investigation.
Extant Information Technology
Extant information technology used to support KM is limited primarily to conventional database management systems (DBMS), data warehouses and mining tools (DW/DM), intranets/extranets, portals and groupware (O'Leary 1998). Arguably, just looking at the word "data" in the names of many "knowledge management tools" (e.g., DBMS, DW/DM), we are not even working at the level of information, much less knowledge. And although (esp. Web-based) Internet tools applied within and between organizations provide a common, machine-independent medium for the distribution and linkage of multimedia documents, extant intranet and extranet applications focus principally on the management and distribution of information, not knowledge per se. Although a great improvement over previous stovepiped systems, islands of automation and other IS maladies, as Nonaka (1994, p. 15) (Russell and Norvig 1995, Turban and Aronson 2001) .
Unlike the extant IT tools noted above, the substance of KBS is knowledge itself-not just information or data-and KBS are designed to interpret and apply represented knowledge directly. These capabilities and features make KBS distinct from most classes of extant IT applications presently employed for KM (Smith and Farquhar 2000) . However, expert system development-through classic knowledge engineering-requires explicit capture and formalization of tacit knowledge possessed by experts. This is just the kind of tacit knowledge that researchers (e.g., Leonard and Sensiper 1998, p. 112 ) stress "underlies many competitive capabilities," but such knowledge has long been known as being "hard to capture." observe a sense of process flow or a life cycle associated with knowledge management. Integrating their survey of the literature (e.g., Despres and Chauvel 1999 , Gartner Group 1999 , Davenport and Prusak 1998 , Nissen 1999 , they synthesize an amalgamated KM life cycle model as outlined in Table 1 . Briefly, the "create" phase begins the life cycle, as new knowledge is generated within an enterprise. The second phase pertains to the organization, mapping or bundling of knowledge. Phase 3 addresses some mechanism for making knowledge formal or explicit, and the fourth phase concerns the ability to share or distribute knowledge in the enterprise. Knowledge application for problem solving or decision making in the organization constitutes Phase 5, and a sixth phase is included to cover knowledge evolution, which reflects organizational learning through time. Drawing further from this research on life cycle models, the authors note that coverage of extant information systems and business practices across these life cycle phases is patchy. For instance, numerous systems and practices are identified from the literature, but they support only three of the six life cycle phases: knowledge organization, formalization and distribution. Alternatively, relatively few counterpart systems and practices are found to correspond with the other three phases: knowledge application, evolution and creation. We thus observe a relative abundance and dearth of systems and practices available to support these respective phases of the KM life cycle.
Knowledge Management Life Cycle
Re-engineering and Knowledge Management Integration
Substantial integration of knowledge management with re-engineering has been observed in current practice, as companies realize the direct connection between KM and knowledge-work process innovation . In their study of more than thirty KM efforts in industry, Davenport et al. (1996) note the practice is "fundamentally change management projects." And emerging theory of knowledge creation and management has a dynamic, distinctly process-oriented flavor (see esp. Nonaka 1994).
Ruggles (1998) goes so far as to suggest a primary objective of the practice is to assess the impact of KM as a process, fundamentally a proposition of re-engineering.
However, as learned through the painful, expensive and failure-prone "first wave" of reengineering (Cypress 1994) , simply inserting information technology (IT) into a process in no way guarantees performance improvement. Indeed, many otherwise successful and effective firms experience process degradation as the result of re-engineering (cf. Caron et al. 1994, Hammer and Champy, 1993 ).
This point is underscored by Hammer (1990) , who colorfully refers to such practice as "automating the mess" (e.g., making a broken process simply operate-broken-faster).
Drawing all the way back to Leavitt (1965) and others (cf. Davenport 1993 , Nissen 1998 , new IT needs to be integrated with the design of the process it supports, which includes consideration of the organization, people, procedures, culture and other key factors, in addition to technology. Given that many KM projects now revolve around IT implementation (e.g., intranets/extranets, Web portals, groupware; cf. , re-engineering and knowledge management even appear to be sharing some of the same mistakes.
Horizontal and Vertical Processes
Building upon the research above, we begin to characterize a powerful interaction between the flow of work (i.e., workflow; cf. Georgakopoulos et al. 1995) and the flow of knowledge (i.e., knowledge flow) in an enterprise. Drawing from Nissen and Espino (2000) , we refer to these respective flows as horizontal processes and vertical processes, as conceptualized in Figure 2 . Briefly, the two horizontal directed graphs in the figure delineate separate instances of a work process (e.g., steps 1 -6 as performed at different points in time, space, organization). The graph at the top of this figure represents one particular instance (e.g., performed at a specific point in time, location, organization) of this notional process, and the graph at the bottom represents a different instance (e.g., performed at a separate point in time, location, organization).
Whereas both horizontal graphs represent the flow of work through the enterprise, however, the vertical graph represents a complementary set of processes responsible for the flow of knowledge. As noted above, knowledge is not evenly distributed through the enterprise, yet management is interested in performance, consistency and effectiveness across various workflows. This requires the associated knowledge (e.g., process procedures, best practices, tool selection and usage) to flow across time, space and organizations. Such cross-process activities are seen as driving the flow of knowledge-as opposed to the flow of work-through the enterprise, and it is upon these vertical process flows that we concentrate in this research.
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Figure 2. Horizontal and Vertical Processes Current Knowledge-Flow Theory
One of the best-known theoretical treatments of knowledge flow to date stems from Nonaka (1994) tacit knowledge (i.e., along the epistemological dimension) flowing from the individual to the group level (i.e., along the ontological dimension). The second flow of knowledge (vector #2) is theorized to occur through a process termed externalization, which denotes the use of metaphors through dialog that leads to articulation of tacit knowledge and its subsequent formalization to make it concrete and explicit.
The third flow of knowledge (vector #3) is theorized to occur through a process termed combination, which denotes coordination between different groups in the organization-along with documentation of existing knowledge-to combine new intra-team concepts with other, explicit knowledge in the organization. The fourth flow of knowledge (vector #4) is theorized to occur through a process termed internalization, which denotes diverse members in the organization applying the combined knowledge from above-often through trial and error-and in turn translating such knowledge into tacit form at the organization level.
UNDERSTANDING-FLOW DYNAMICS
This section begins by building upon Nonaka's theory to conceptualize an extended model of the knowledge-flow phenomenon. In keeping with the military focus of this technical report, we refer instead to this phenomenon as understanding flow.
Building upon Current Theory
The first step toward building upon current knowledge-flow theory pertains to the concept from above of a KM life cycle. We propose to augment Nonaka's two-dimensional framework through incorporation of this third dimension, and we operationalize the construct using the life-cycle stages from the Amalgamated Model described above (i.e., creation, organization, formalization, distribution, application, refinement).
Further, because the concept flow is inherently dynamic, we also extend this framework through incorporation of time as a key, fourth dimension. Such augmented dimensionality preserves-and indeed subsumes-the two-dimensional framework proposed through current theory, and it provides the basis for a richer model, which may enhance our descriptive and explanatory power in terms of understanding the understanding-flow phenomenon.
The second step toward building upon current knowledge-flow theory pertains to the epistemological dimension theorized above, as it includes only binary states (i.e., tacit, explicit). In contrast, we propose that understanding fills a continuum along the dimension characterized by tacit and explicit endpoints. Thus, instead of a simple contrast between explicit and tacit understanding, this would enable us to trace understanding as it flows through a continuous range of explicitness. We defer operationalization of the concept explicitness until the empirical, field-study section below, but a continuous dimension makes for a richer model than-and indeed subsumes-one with only two binary states.
This same rationale can be applied to the ontological dimension theorized above, as it supports only a few granular states (e.g., individual, group, organization). In contrast, we propose that understanding may fill a continuum along the dimension characterized by how many people are reached by the understanding (e.g., at a particular level of explicitness, life cycle phase). Operationalization of this reach concept is similarly deferred to the field-study section below, but tracing understanding flows across a continuous dimension similarly makes for a richer model than-and indeed subsumes-one with only a few discrete states.
A third step toward theory building stems from the research noted above that differentiates between vertical processes and their horizontal-process counterparts in terms of enabling knowledge versus work flows, respectively. Such differentiation is simply absent from current theory. But it highlights an important, cross-process focus of understanding flow, and it may help explain the mechanics associated with prior theory (e.g., Nonaka's concepts of socialization, externalization, combination). 
Figure 4. Layered Understanding Transfer
A final step toward building upon current work addresses the mechanics of understanding flow. If one accepts that knowledge 1 is distinct from-yet related to-information and data, flow concepts such as socialization and externalization seem quite incomplete, as they fail to recognize the respective roles of data (e.g., words used to share experiences), information (e.g., conveyed through metaphors and dialog) and knowledge (e.g., capability and expertise shared across individuals).
Drawing an analogy from the International Organization for Standards (ISO) datacommunications model (Panko 1997 )-which has seven layers involved with data communication (i.e., flow) between any two computer applications-we conceptualize understanding to similarly pass through successive layers. And drawing from the cognitive-hierarchy discussion above, we propose the mechanics of understanding flow as beginning with conversion from knowledge 2 , through information, to data in one agent (e.g., Agent A, human or machine). The data are then transmitted through some media (e.g., network, voice, handwritten page)-according to the ISO model-and the flow in some other agent (e.g., Agent B)
is reversed-from data, through information, to knowledge. This is depicted in Figure 4 , which explicitly distinguishes between data, information and knowledge associated with the flow.
One key insight is consistent with our NCW quotation in the introduction: the flow of understanding is not the domain of networks and communications. Rather, it lies squarely in the (vertical) processes that agents (e.g., human, machine) use to convert understanding for, and transfer it across, such networks and communications. This may have major implications in terms of how we design information systems to automate and support understanding flow in the enterprise.
This insight also helps resolve the apparent tension between advocates of knowledge hierarchies with data on the "bottom" (cf. Davenport and Prusak 1998 , von Krough et al. 2000 versus data on the "top" (cf. Tuomi 2000) . In short, understanding flow can be visualized as progressing "down" the first hierarchy-knowledge to information to data-and then conversely progressing "up" the second hierarchy-data to information to knowledge. Whether the hierarchy has data on the bottom or data on the top, therefore, would simply depend upon one's perspective (e.g., as producer or consumer of understanding). 
An Extended Model of Understanding Flow
. Extended Model with Understanding Flows
The theory building from above provides the grist from which to develop an extended model of the understanding-flow phenomenon. In Figure 5 3 , we note a few, notional, understanding-flow vectors for illustrating and classifying various dynamic patterns of understanding as it flows through the enterprise.
For instance, the simple linear flow labeled "P&P" depicts the manner in which most enterprises inform and train employees through the use of policies and procedures: explicit documents and guidelines that individuals in the organization are expected to memorize, refer to and observe. As another instance, the cyclical flow of understanding described by the amalgamated KM life cycle model from above, depicted and labeled as "KMLC" in the figure, reflects a more-complex dynamic than its simple, linear counterpart.
And as depicted, this latter flow delineates a cycle of understanding creation, distribution and evolution within a workgroup, for example.
2 Again, with our business/military mapping, this conversion would be from understanding, through knowledge/processed data, to raw data, and so forth. 3 Because Nonaka's terminology for the dimensions reflected in Figure 3 can lead to confusion (e.g., with respect to use of the terms epistemological and ontological), we substitute the term explicitness for epistemological and reach for ontological in Figure 5 .
Further, Nonaka's dynamic flow theory can also be delineated in this space by the curvilinear vector sequence K-S-E-C-I. Referring back to his model above, these vectors correspond to the processes termed creation, socialization, externalization, combination and internalization, respectively. From this, our model subsumes the one proposed by Nonaka, and it reveals a somewhat-complex dynamic as understanding flows along the life cycle. Moreover, examination of this space suggests also including the "R" vector (refinement), which is not part of Nonaka's theory but represents a key element of the empirically derived Amalgamated Model (e.g., key to knowledge evolution). Clearly, a great many other flows and patterns can be depicted in this manner. We employ this vector-space approach to depicting and visualizing understanding flows in the field study below.
JTF FIELD STUDY
In this section, we report the findings from field research, most of which takes place afloat on naval warships conducting military operations at sea. Clearly, this is where many key activities (e.g., situational awareness, tactical decision making, strike execution, damage assessment) associated with military processes take place, and one cannot attempt to understand the complex environment that corresponds without direct observation. In this field study, such direct observation takes place onboard the USS Alpha This is the significance of the term joint above (i.e., joint forces).
Following the terminology of Yin (1994) , we undertake a Type I field study (i.e., single case, single unit of analysis). The case represents an extreme one, however, so we anticipate obtaining informative findings even from this one study. The single unit of analysis is that of the joint task force, as managed by the CJTF. The case itself focuses on one JTF operation (i.e., DELTA WATCH). This JTF and operation is representative of contemporary military organizations and processes in action, so generalization to other commands and operations should be straightforward. need to know what missions they are supposed to complete, when and where they are supposed to complete them, with whom and with which weapons they might best be completed successfully, and how to perform their specific mission tasks.
In many respects, these requirements are similar to the kinds of management and professionalism required for effective processes in business or government. For instance, executives, managers and knowledge workers in business firms and governmental agencies must similarly understand what needs to be accomplished, where, with whom and how to accomplish it, and so forth. Thus, many of our results are expected to generalize beyond just military processes. But one aspect of this management and professionalism is clearly extreme in this case under study: timing; that is, all of the plans, people, machines and other factors must be in place and come together at the same time
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In terms of understanding and its flow through the JTF enterprise, the implication is, substantial military understanding must complete its required flow through the enterprise by a specific point in time (e.g., the launch of an attack). As one experienced aviator describes, there's no time for learning your craft when flying an F/A-18 jet at 500 knots, 50 feet above the ocean surface, heading into hostile territory (e.g., confronting surface-to-air missiles) on a strike sortie. Indeed, if we can effectively address understanding flow in this extreme case of the JTF enterprise, adapting understanding-flow techniques and technologies to less extreme enterprises (e.g., peace-time military operations, business and governmental enterprises)
should be quite feasible.
The setting of this investigation includes two large naval formations: 1) a carrier battlegroup (CVBG) and 2) an amphibious ready group (ARG). The CVBG includes a full-size aircraft carrier, which is large enough to launch and recover fixed-wing jet aircraft (e.g., fighter, attack, surveillance), and a host of support vessels (e.g., cruisers, destroyers, submarines) to make up an ensemble for conducting offensive and defensive maritime and air operations. The ARG includes a smaller carrier, which is used to launch and recover rotary-wing aircraft (e.g., attack, anti-submarine, transport) and amphibious-landing craft, along with its own complement of support vessels. The primary mission of the CVBG is power projection and to establish military superiority (esp. air and maritime), as it is designed and trained for strike, intercept, anti-submarine and maritime-interdiction missions. The ARG is principally employed for invasion purposes, as it is designed and trained to get Marines ashore for expeditionary warfare. With this investigation addressing joint operations, several Air Force squadrons, a number of Army units and foreign militaries also participate, but we focus in particular on sea-based forces (i.e., the CVBG and ARG).
Operation DELTA WATCH is conducted in international waters, with operational areas extending hundreds of miles from East to West and nearly a thousand miles from North to South. Adjoining international waters are territories of several different countries-allied, neutral and (potentially) hostile.
Each country represents a sovereign nation, and each has its own air, land and naval forces in the area. In all, the operational area may have several hundred contacts (e.g., aircraft, ships, submarines)-identified on tactical and operational displays as "friendly," "hostile" and "unidentified"-at any one time, including civilian and commercial planes and ships, in addition to their military counterparts.
Identifying, interrogating, keeping track of, and responding to such a large number of contacts exceeds the bounded rationality of any single individual, yet the CJTF strives to have all units and personnel "speak with one voice," "act with one intention," and "move as one unit." This is very challenging for such a large, geographically dispersed enterprise that operates at sea (e.g., without landbased communications infrastructure), oftentimes in hostile waters. In terms of understanding understanding flow through this VLE, we focus our attention on the understanding required to enable coordinated and effective military operations through DELTA WATCH.
Key Understanding Elements
Through our immersive field study methods outlined above (esp. participant observation, strategic contact, semi-structured interviews), we identify and gain insight into four key elements of understanding required for the JTF enterprise: 1) understanding about contacts in the operational area (e.g., friendly/hostile, speed/heading, offensive/defensive capabilities), 2) understanding of the operational area itself (e.g., geography/waters, geopolitics, weather), 3) military combat understanding (e.g., combat tactics, weapons, unit synchronization), and 4) understanding to plan military operations (e.g., intelligence implications, battle/campaign strategies, mission profiles). Some of these aspects can be satisfied with explicit understanding, and information technologies such as digital communication networks, decision support systems and groupware are employed to support the corresponding understanding flows. Others, however, rely principally upon tacit understanding-which resides within the minds and bodies of experienced, individual people-and are not as conducive to IT support. Using the framework developed above, we classify each of these key understanding elements according to three dimensions: 1) explicitness, 2) reach and 3) flow time. Table 2 summarizes this classification. We first take steps toward operationalizing these dimensional constructs. We then use such constructs to classify and describe the four key understanding elements.
Operationalization
As noted above, we theorize the dimension explicitness in terms of a continuum, but we presently lack an appropriate scale or instrument for effective operationalization as a measurable construct. Alternatively, we can operationalize understanding in terms of actions that it enables (e.g., correct decisions, appropriate behaviors). For instance, we can draw from research on learning (i.e., understanding transfer) and pedagogy (Bloom 1956 ) to identify six, increasingly tacit states of understanding-operationalized through enabled actions-that can be mapped to this dimension: 1) memorization, 2) comprehension, 3) application, 4) analysis, 5) synthesis, and 6) evaluation. We anticipate being able to differentiate between these six explicitness levels when describing various understanding flows in the field.
As also noted above, we theorize the dimension reach in terms of a continuum. And if we define this construct in terms of the number of people associated with a particular understanding flow (e.g., at a specific level of explicitness, at a specific stage of the life cycle), then we should be able to construct a numerical scale for measurement in the field. In the case of military forces at sea, however, the enterprise is organized through highly structured and cohesive units (e.g., squadrons), departments (e.g., Operations), vessels (e.g., USS Charlie) and formations (e.g., CVBG). Thus, the course granularity of Nonaka's operationalization scheme-in terms of unit size (e.g., individual, group, organization)-appears to be more informative than the number of people in a particular organization, so we stay with this former approach to operationalizing the reach dimension in this study. 
Understanding Element Classification and Description
Returning to the key understanding elements summarized in Table 2 , understanding of contacts is quite explicit, and most such understanding is directly associated with interaction between people and information systems. For instance, the speed, heading and capabilities of hostile and friendly contacts need to be comprehended. This understanding supports the situational-awareness process, which is similar to the kind of environmental scanning activity long discussed as critical in the business context of executive information systems (EIS). However, this comprehended understanding must be shared by practically all JTF participants, groups and organizations in a theater of operations for such a large force to coordinate its plans and activities. In terms of flow time, use of sensors and information systems facilitates development and distribution of a common operational picture within a matter of hours. This first understanding element is plotted as symbol "1" in Figure 6 for reference and illustration; that is, this symbol is plotted at the comprehension level along the explicitness axis, at the inter-organization point of the reach dimension, and at the hours magnitude in terms of flow time. 
Figure 6. Plotted Understanding Elements
Regarding understanding of the operational area, this is far more tacit in nature than its contacts counterpart from above. The surrounding geography (e.g., mountains, deserts, ports), ocean conditions (e.g., currents, depths, salinity levels), geopolitical situations (e.g., strained foreign relations, hostilities, popular unrest) and weather forecasts (e.g., cloud cover, visibility, moonlight illumination) must all be synthesized together into a cohesive understanding of the environment in which operations are being conducted. Because each unit in the JTF (e.g., Navy ship, Air Force wing, Marine expeditionary unit) performs a different role (e.g., anti-submarine, strike, invasion), the nature of this understanding necessarily differs, so we plot this at the organization level along the reach axis (see symbol "2" in the figure) . For instance, ocean temperature and salinity are critical to hunting enemy submarines but irrelevant to aerial bombardment. In terms of flow time, operational area understanding can complete its flow through a particular organization (e.g., naval ship, fighter wing, expeditionary unit) in a matter of weeks, as sailors, officers and commanders acquire local experience in each theater of operations.
Regarding understanding of combat, this is principally explicit 6 , the content of express military doctrine and techniques that are studied and memorized in military academies, training schools and war colleges. This understanding is also specific to each job and applicable at the individual level, as everyone has a particular responsibility in a military operation and is expected to perform accordingly and effectively. This, execution-oriented understanding generally takes years to acquire and develop, with the corresponding point plotted as symbol "3" in the figure.
Alternatively, understanding of operational planning begins as a creative activity. It takes place in relatively small groups (e.g., comprised of the CJTF, combatant commanders, key staff members such as
Intelligence and Operations), as alternative plans and courses of action are synthesized. However, the understanding-intensive focus of this activity involves more refinement and evolution of plans than creation, as the group is engaged in constant evaluation. Much like a chess master is always contemplating many possible courses of play and thinking several moves in advance of the current board position, this military understanding is highly tacit and subject to iterative re-evaluation. This understanding element is plotted as symbol "4" in the figure. Notice that decades are required for such understanding to develop in JTF "executives" (i.e., admirals, generals).
This summarizes the key elements of understanding and classifies them according to our threedimensional framework 7 to provide a picture of understanding in the JTF enterprise. Notice, the four key understanding elements identified for study are widely distributed throughout our three-dimensional representational space. Such wide distribution helps ensure that we address a variety of diverse understanding flows in this study.
Vertical Processes and Understanding Flows
In this section, we discuss vertical processes and understanding flows corresponding to the four key understanding elements outlined above. Such processes and flows associated with each understanding element are addressed in turn.
Contacts Understanding
When the JTF first arrives in a new theater, some of the key understanding elements from above are already in place, whereas others need to be developed nearly from scratch, and some fall in between these extremes. At one extreme is contacts understanding. Before the JTF arrives in a theater of operations, it has very little information pertaining to contacts in the area, as such an area can be half a world away and well out of sensor range. The task force is not completely "blind," however, as the military's Foxtrot system provides global sensor feeds to ships, planes and land units. But such Foxtrot inputs are incomplete, and the JTF cannot establish situational awareness until it arrives in theater and begins to make and analyze contacts with its own sensors. The JTF also receives intelligence reports pertaining to contacts in the theater, which can be disseminated securely using the Golf network. But intelligence reports outside the JTF itself tend to be viewed with some suspicion, and JTF commanders do not seem to feel confident about their understanding of contacts until they arrive in theater and begin their own intelligence operations. As a note, this cultural pattern appears to be independent of organizational size. For instance, with respect to such intelligence reports, a large aircraft carrier with 5000 people onboard (i.e., one organization) is likely to behave in a manner very similar to that of a much-smaller ship (e.g., a frigate) with only a fraction of the number of people onboard. This serves to reinforce our preference for Nonaka's granular reach operationalization over use of a continuous scale (e.g., number of people).
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substitute the dimension KM life cycle for flow time, which provides a complementary perspective to the elements plotted in Figure 6 .
The vertical processes associated with the flow of contacts understanding center on information technology and intelligence operations. The information technology employed to drive this understanding flow is quite formal, in that official systems (e.g., sensors, networks, applications) are employed. However, observation of JTF officers conducting what they term the battle watch-through which the overall course of Operation DELTA WATCH is monitored and directed-we also identify information technology being used in a less formal manner. For instance, (encrypted) e-mail messages are routinely sent across the Golf network between ships at sea, and all of the larger ships (e.g., carriers, communications ships, command ships) have (classified) Web servers that are used to organize and disseminate information among JTF participants. Additionally, conversations with one Battle Watch Captain (i.e., our strategic contact) indicate several (secure) "chat rooms" are employed to discuss various aspects of operations across wireless networks at sea. Unlike the formal systems above, these latter uses of IT are relatively informal, in that the associated processes have emerged organically, as opposed to being designed for use and officially sanctioned.
As noted above, contacts understanding is very explicit in nature, requiring comprehension by JTF personnel, but it must be disseminated JTF-wide in order to support a common operational picture. In Figure 7 , we delineate the corresponding understanding flow as beginning with creation of new contacts understanding at the organization level (point "q") through synthesis of sensor data and intelligence information, with an organization in this case representing an individual ship (e.g., the ALPHA, CHARLIE, ECHO). This understanding is then organized according to a common geographical display format and distributed across the various JTF organizations to be comprehended (point "r").
In terms of understanding flow, this vector is relatively simple when compared to those discussed below, but such contacts-understanding flows are critical to effective task-force operations nonetheless.
Notice from Figure 7 , the flow of contacts understanding remains at the levels of organization and interorganization in terms of reach, whereas some other understanding flows, discussed below, occur principally at the individual and group levels. Contacts understanding is also quite explicit, whereas some other understanding flows are more tacit in nature. Further, contacts understanding does not begin to flow until the JTF arrives in its theater of operations, and the time required is relatively short, whereas the time required for some other understanding flows is much longer and must be completed before such arrival. As noted above, the contacts-understanding element represents one extreme in terms of understanding flow. Understanding flows pertaining to the operational area are similar to those described above with respect to contacts, in that much of this flow does not begin until arrival in theater. However, the information that supports synthesis of understanding about the operational area lends itself to easy distribution via network, so JTF personnel are not required to wait until their arrival in theater. Indeed, discussions with JTF personnel indicate informal IT (e.g., e-mail, Web, telephone) is used for this very purpose. In either case, the synthesis takes place at the organizational level and involves the creation of new understanding: a composite picture of the operational area. The understanding associated with this element is described by a simple vector (i.e., s-t) in Figure 8 , as operational area understanding is simply created and distributed at the organizational level. The vertical processes used to develop such military-specific understanding include training (e.g., military schools), experience (e.g., operations at sea), mentorship (e.g., close and sustained interaction with more experienced warriors) and assignment (e.g., selection of the right person for each job). In terms of our three-dimensional schema for tracking understanding flow, each of these vertical processes has a unique vector associated with it.
Operational Area Understanding
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The first vector, delineated by the points "a," "b" and "c" in Figure 9 , is associated with training.
Training represents the distribution of explicit understanding from an organization to the individual (a), who must first learn to apply it in the training environment (b) and then commit it to memory for The next vector, delineated by the points "g" and "h" in Figure 10 , is associated with experience and commonly referred to as on-the-job training (OJT). This process is highly valued in the military, as experience often counts more toward being selected for specific jobs and assignments than does education, training, personality or most other qualifications do. We do not understand the mechanics of this flow nearly as well as those pertaining to training above, as the understanding associated with experiential learning is highly tacit, and the associated cognitive processes are more the domain of psychology and learning theory than information systems. But following Nonaka, such tacit understanding is presumed to begin with creation at the individual level, and we delineate the understanding-flow vector following the life cycle through refinement and evolution in the figure. In essence, we view this as a cycle of understanding-which remains tacit at the individual level-passing through various steps of the life cycle repeatedly. The next vector, delineated by the points "j," "k," "m" and "n" in Figure 11 , is associated with mentorship. It is common for commanding and senior officers onboard ship to critique the decisions and actions of junior officers, for instance, providing guidance for learning important techniques and templates for improving their performance. The most common manifestation of such mentorship in the JTF is dyadic in nature and occurs between pairs of individuals of different rank. This represents a flow at the individual level, but it takes place between one individual (e.g., senior officer) and another (e.g., junior officer) as delineated in the figure. New understanding to be acquired by the junior officer is first created through the mentor's evaluation (j). The protégé must comprehend and organize the understanding associated with the mentor's critique (k). We highlight the k point with an asterisk (i.e., "k*") to note this involves a different individual than that corresponding with point "j." From here, discussions with people onboard the ALPHA suggest a cycle of formalization and synthesis (m), application, refinement and evolution follows, with the associated understanding becoming increasingly tacit as it flows (n). Once this becomes internalized as part of the junior officer's understanding base, participants onboard ship describe it as combining with the officer's experience (i.e., OJT) and converging with the understanding-flow vector delineated in Figure 10 above (see cyclical vector between points "g" and "h"). Thus, we find that understanding flows from different vertical processes (e.g., experience, mentorship) clearly interact with one another. But this latter flow does not initiate until the mentor evaluates the protégé's performance and provides a critique.
Finally, the vector delineated by points "o" and "p" in Figure 12 is associated with assignment.
Here, tacit understanding, possessed collectively by people throughout the enterprise (o), flows along with the individual person (p) assigned to each specific job (e.g., to be applied in some other part of the enterprise). In essence, this vertical process identifies which individual(s) in the enterprise is best qualified to apply his or her understanding to a specific job/assignment. As above, we find a clear interaction between various vertical processes and their associated understanding flows.
Looking back across these four figures and the flows corresponding to the vertical processes associated with the understanding element of combat, one can observe several different dynamic patterns.
The vectors delineate various directions in the explicitness dimension (e.g., tacit to explicit, explicit to tacit) that are associated with these flows, which serve to reinforce one part of Nonaka's dynamics of These understanding flows do not correspond to the theoretical models closely, however, suggesting that such models require additional development and refinement before they match empirical findings. For instance, although the vectors cross several tacit and explicit levels and different degrees of reach, as proposed by Nonaka, they do not follow the specific sequencing and dynamics he discusses (e.g., socialization, externalization, combination). Similarly, the understanding-flow vectors span multiple life cycle stages (e.g., create, organize, formalize), but they do not pass through all of them, in a consistent sequence, or even unidirectionally. Hence, this differs from the customary characterization of such flows in most life cycle models.
Operational Planning Understanding
Operational planning is quite similar to combat in terms of the vertical processes that drive the associated understanding flows, because people must master combat early in their careers before ever getting a chance to engage in operational planning. Thus, the (vertical) training, experience, mentorship and assignment processes from above all contribute toward effective operational planning capabilities as well, and the corresponding understanding flows are well represented by the vectors delineated through the combat figures (i.e., Figures 9 -12 ).
However, operational planning involves new-understanding creation, whereas combat is far moreapplied in orientation. Also, operational planning is generally accomplished in small groups, whereas combat understanding is principally associated with the individual. Thus, the understanding flow associated with the group's operational planning capability involves an additional dynamic that augments combat flows. Before the group can create and evaluate military plans for the task force, its members must learn to work together effectively, develop a common set of terms, and establish the processes that will be used to develop the plans. In essence, such operational planning understanding pertains to a virtual organization (e.g., comprised of the CJTF, combatant commanders, others) that comes together for the JTF operation. From our observations at sea, the group's formal leader (i.e., the CJTF) begins this virtual organizing through the vertical process of leadership, which drives tacit understanding and is done as an individual (point "u" in Figure 13 ). This leadership understanding is used to formulate an approach for communicating with other group members and enlisting their active participation in the planning process. Understanding about what is expected of the other members is deeply rooted in military culture and tradition, which all members bring with them to the JTF operation 8 . The leader's communication can be viewed more as filling in a template with specific information than transferring understanding per se, but the group members must comprehend and be able to apply the leader's suggestions for how the group is to perform (point "v").
Working together, the group then applies its collective tacit understanding to synthesize some alternative plans and courses of action (point "w"), which then become the focus of continuous evaluation and refinement (point "x"). As can be seen from the corresponding vectors delineated in Figure 13 , this latter vertical process of leadership has its own characteristic pattern of understanding flow. Notice, IT is not included among the vertical processes driving understanding flow for this planning element. This may represent an opportunity in terms of IT application.
Summary
To summarize, the key vertical processes found to drive understanding flow in the JTF are diverse, as are the corresponding understanding-flow vectors. In examining the four key elements of understanding above (i.e., contacts, operational area, combat, operational planning), we identify nine vertical processes that are associated. These are listed in Table 3 . Notice, only two of the four key understanding elements are associated with IT-enabled vertical processes: contacts and operational area.
Understanding flows driven by the nine vertical processes are summarized in Figure 14 Alternatively, the vectors associated with contacts (i.e., q-r) and operational area (i.e., s-t) are delineated with solid lines and reveal a very different pattern of flow through the enterprise. This latter understanding-flow pattern occurs much further out along the reach axis than the others, and the associated understanding is more explicit overall. These contacts and operational area understanding flows also span a smaller portion of the life cycle dimension than their combat and planning counterparts. Interestingly, drawing from our summary in Table 3 above, notice that these latter understanding flows are well supported by information technology as vertical processes, whereas the former flows are not. Thus, we are beginning to establish a correspondence between understanding-flow patterns-which can be examined visually through vector plots-and the kinds of vertical processes that drive them. This represents the beginning of a contribution to be made through the present study.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Network-centric warfare emphasizes information superiority for battlespace efficacy, but it is clear that the mechanics of how knowledge flows are just as important as those pertaining to the networks and communication systems used to transmit data and information. Unfortunately, with the strong presumption that knowledge is distinct from data and information, knowledge-flow mechanics in the warfare context are not well understood; even the term knowledge is used in conflicting ways (e.g., to describe information flows) by NCW experts, operational personnel and developers of military doctrine. Mapping key concepts from technologically enabled business models-on which NCW is based in large part-to the military, we substitute the term understanding flow when discussing the mechanics of how knowledge flows in the NCW context. In one respect, this mapping and terminological substitution enable us to move forward and model knowledge-flow mechanics in a manner that is consistent with the operational Navy's lexicon; in another respect, however, it is clear that Navy lexicon does not yet include the term understanding flow.
Hence, naval conceptualization of NCW may be missing a vital element.
Informed by recent advances in knowledge-flow theory, the research described in this technical report develops a four-dimensional model of understanding-flow mechanics. This multidimensional model enables a novel capability to recognize a variety of understanding-flow patterns found in the military enterprise, to distinguish such patterns from their counterparts pertaining to information and data, and to enhance the speed and efficiency of NCW understanding flows. Just as understanding the mechanics of electrical flow is critical to developing useful electronic devices (e.g., amplifiers, integrated circuits), and understanding airflow mechanics is essential for designing useful aircraft equipment (e.g., engines, wings), understanding the mechanics of understanding flow is critical to conceiving useful NCW systems (e.g., "knowledge engines," "knowledge amplifiers"). To help make understanding-flow concepts and applications concrete, we employ our model of understanding flow to Navy-led, joint task force (JTF) operations at sea. The result is an increased understanding of understanding flow for network-centric warfare, which can be employed to guide the design of useful information systems, understanding-flow devices and business processes for military operations. Second, the flow of work through a military enterprise (e.g., JTF) is distinct from, yet closely interrelated with, the flow of understanding through the enterprise. However, most commanders focus in detail on how work is progressing but pay little attention to how the corresponding understandingunderstanding that enables the work to be accomplished-is flowing through the enterprise. Clearly, simple point measures such as readiness fail to capture the rich dynamics of understanding flow through the military enterprise. Indeed, one can envision the commander of tomorrow employing sophisticated tools (e.g., PERT networks, Gantt Charts) to track the progress of understanding flow, in addition to using such tools to track and manage workflow.
Finally, where the design of information systems and business processes is required to enable and support NCW, such design must take advantage of understanding how understanding flows through the military enterprise. By building upon the kind of research presented in this technical report, designers of information systems, business processes and even understanding-flow devices can now obtain a view into the mechanics of how understanding flows through the enterprise, and such view can effectively inform their design activities. As the informed-design process progresses, and we can obtain feedback on how well the designs serve their intended purposes in the NCW context, we must be vigilant about continuing to learn from such feedback and improving the theory underlying understanding flow. For such learning and theory can recursively continue to inform better the design process, and vice versa. This can lead to a virtuous cycle of discovery and application, the kind of cycle enabled by a strong partnership between the university (e.g., Naval Postgraduate School) and the Fleet (e.g., Third Fleet). 
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